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Political Violence and International Law:
The Case of Northern Ireland
ALPHA M. CONNELLY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the best tradition of British understatement, the violence of the
last twenty years in Northern Ireland is referred to locally as "the Trou-
bles". Sparked off by civil rights grievances, the Troubles are but the lat-
est chapter in a long-running saga of armed resistance to a British pres-
ence in Ireland. The forefront of the resistance in this century has been
the Irish Republican Army. Today armed resistance is concentrated in
Northern Ireland, which is constitutionally part of the United Kingdom.
Here the I.R.A. claims to be waging a war of national liberation on behalf
of the Irish people against alien, i.e. British rule. In this scenario, the
British troops in Northern Ireland are seen not as knights in shining ar-
mor upholding law and order and protecting the ordinary citizen, but as
forces of occupation, oppressors who would deny to the Irish people the
realization of their right to self-determination. This paper will examine
the claim of the I.R.A. at the present day to be an army of national liber-
ation.1 The legitimacy of the claim will be assessed against the norms and
principles of public international law. The I.R.A. itself asserts not only a
moral right to use violence but also a legal right, expressly invoking recog-
* Faculty of Law, University College, Dublin, Ireland. This is a revised version of a
paper delivered to the conference International Terrorism: Challenge and Response at the
University of Denver College of Law, 4 April 1987.
1. In this paper the term I.R.A. is used to signify the Provisional Irish Republican
Army. The Provisional I.R.A. is not the only body using armed force in Northern Ireland
apart from the British army and the police. There are other groups both on the loyalist/
unionist side and on the nationalist side which use force either, as in the case of the loyal-
ists, to maintain the link with Britain, or, as in the case of the nationalists, to sever the link.
The Provisional I.R.A. is the largest organized grouping of a military character to promote
the nationalist cause. There is some uncertainty over whether the Official I.R.A., from which
the Provisionals split in 1969/70, has in fact disbanded, but whether or not it has done so, it
is clear that the Officials have not engaged in any significant military action in recent years
and that, as they moved to the left politically, the voices advocating the use of the estab-
lished political process rather than violence in pursuit of national unity prevailed. The other
main nationalist grouping, the Irish National Liberation Army, which was established in
1975, has itself recently split over the question of its continued existence, and has been
subject to a bitter internal feud, with members of rival factions killing one another. The
examination in this paper of the claim of the Provisional I.R.A. applies mutatis mutandis to
these other militant nationalist groups. The claimed justification for resort to force by loyal-
ist paramilitary organizations, such as the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster Freedom
Fighters, is of course somewhat different to that of the I.R.A., and any examination of their
claims is outside the scope of this paper.
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nized principles of international law to validate its actions.2
International law has traditionally applied, and still applies, two gen-
eral tests in relation to armed conflicts to determine the legality of the
use of violence, and each test is based on a different body of rules. The
first is a threshold test with respect to the legality of the initial resort to
violence. In its application to inter-state conflict, this test is often de-
scribed by the Latin tag, jus in bellum, the right to go to war or to engage
in armed conflict. It is, for example, universally recognized that one state
is entitled to use armed force against another in self-defense, and interna-
tional law defines the circumstances in which resort to armed force by
way of self-defense is justified. In the post-1945 era, the concept of inter-
national armed conflict has been extended to cover situations other than
the classic inter-state combat, and a threshold test also applies to these
other situations. Of particular relevance to this paper is the fact that, in
recent years, there has been increasing recognition of the legitimacy of
resort to force by an entity other than the state. This entity is a people,
and the circumstances in which a people (or their representatives) are
justified in resorting to force is when the people are subject to colonial
domination or alien occupation, resort to force being justified against the
colonizer or occupying power. The people often perceive of themselves
(and are perceived) as a nation, and hence when force is used to reject
alien rule, the struggle is described as a war of national liberation. The
I.R.A. claim relates to this threshold test. It is a claim that the I.R.A. is
waging in Northern Ireland a war of national liberation on behalf of the
Irish people against a colonial power.3
The threshold test is a group test. It applies to a state, a people, or
some other collectivity, and is used to assess the legality of resort to force
by the collectivity. It does not apply to specific incidents of violence en-
gaged in by the group or by members of the group. These incidents are
judged by other rules.
When armed conflict erupts, there is an extensive body of rules and
principles of international law, jus in bello, which seeks to regulate the
conflict. There are rules regulating both international armed conflicts (the
type of armed conflict in which the I.R.A. claims to be engaged) and non-
international armed conflicts.4 These rules, known collectively as interna-
tional humanitarian law, have been supplemented over the last forty
years or so by international human rights norms and an evolving interna-
tional criminal law which penalizes certain activities (e.g. genocide and
2. SINN FEIN, A SCENARIO FOR PEACE: A DiscussION PAPER 3-4 (1987).
3. Although the I.R.A. regard the Southern Irish authorities as illegitimate, and indeed
as having aligned themselves politically and economically with Britain, it is I.R.A. policy not
to use violence against these authorities. See, e.g., G. ADAMS, THE POLITICS OF IRISH FREE-
DOM 39f (1986), and T.P. COOGAN, THE I.R.A. 327-8, 681 (3d ed. 1987).
4. See, e.g., the two Geneva Protocols of 1977 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949. Protocol I relates to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Con-
flicts; Protocol II to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.
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hijacking) both in time of peace and of armed conflict. Even if the use of
violence does not meet the minimum level required to constitute an
armed conflict and hence be governed by the rules of international hu-
manitarian law, international criminal law will apply to the activities of
all those engaged in violent conduct, and the state authorities will addi-
tionally be bound by the norms of international human rights law.
The term international armed conflict now includes wars of national
liberation,5 and if, as the I.R.A. claims, the present violence in Northern
Ireland is occurring in the context of such a war, then the rules of inter-
national humanitarian law relating to international armed conflicts apply.
If it is not, then other rules apply. The important point is that irrespec-
tive of the precise categorization of the violence under international law,
and irrespective of the legitimacy of the I.R.A. claim, some rules apply,
and members of the I.R.A. as well as of the state authorities may be held
accountable under international law for their conduct. Even a legitimate
cause does not of itself legitimate every use of violence by those fighting
for the cause. Even a war of national liberation does not necessarily vali-
date every act of violence by the liberation army and its individual
members.
This paper is concerned with the threshold test of the legality under
international law of the I.R.A.'s resort to violence. It is not concerned
with the legality of specific incidents or tactics. Nor is it concerned with
the ethics or politics of the I.R.A. claim. It does not deal with whether the
I.R.A. should be regarded as a national liberation movement, but with
whether it is so recognized under international law at the present time
and with whether its claim to be exercising the right of self-determination
of the Irish people is well-founded in law or not. The self-perception of a
group is not sufficient in law to confer on it the status claimed. The group
must fulfil the requirements posited by law for the enjoyment of that
status.
II. THE I.R.A. CLAIM
The beacon of militant Irish nationalism in this century is the Proc-
lamation of the Irish Republic on Easter Monday, 1916, by a motley col-
lection of insurrectionaries outside the main post office in the center of
Dublin. The Proclamation, "the Magna Carta of all Irish Republicans",'
was signed by seven men claiming to speak on behalf of the Provisional
Government of the Republic of Ireland, and was addressed by that Gov-
ernment to the people of Ireland:
"Irishmen and Irishwomen: In the name of God and of the dead gen-
erations from which she receives her old tradition of nationhood, Ire-
land, through us, summons her children to her flag and strikes for her
freedom ....
5. Geneva Protocol I, Art.1(4).
6. CooGAN, supra note 3, at 38.
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We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of
Ireland and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign
and indefeasible. The long usurpation of that right by a foreign people
and government has not extinguished the right, nor can it ever be ex-
tinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people. In every gen-
eration the Irish people have asserted their right to national freedom
and sovereignty.. . Standing on that fundamental right and again as-
serting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby proclaim the
Irish Republic as a Sovereign Independent State, and we pledge our
lives and the lives of our comrades-in-arms to the cause of its free-
dom, of its welfare and of its exaltation among the nations ...
Until our arms have brought the opportune moment for the es-
tablishing of a permanent National Government, representative of the
whole people of Ireland, and elected by the suffrages of all her men
and women, the Provisional Government, hereby constituted, will ad-
minister the civil and military affairs of the Republic in trust for the
people. . ."(extracts from the Proclamation).
Neither the Sovereign Independent State nor the permanent Na-
tional Government, representative of the whole people of Ireland, envis-
aged by the Proclamation, have ever come into existence. The insurrec-
tion, or the Rising as it is popularly known, was a failure. However, in the
history of Irish nationalism, nothing succeeds like failure, especially a
bloody failure. The execution by the British of many of the leaders of the
Rising elicited revulsion among the Irish people and ensured that the
high-sounding phrases of the Proclamation would echo down the century,
assuring and inspiring those who see in Northern Ireland the continued
denial by an alien government of the right of the Irish people to control
its own destiny.
Irish nationalism was of course not born in 1916. It has its roots deep
in the past in wars of conquest, resistance, reconquest and renewed resis-
tance. Despite centuries of rule by England, the Irish were never assimi-
lated. They retained a sense of separate identity, an identity which ac-
commodated without yielding to colonial influences. The English common
law may have replaced the Irish Brehon law, but the Irish maintained
different traditions and culture to the conqueror. The use of the Irish
language may have diminished in favor of English, but as Engels re-
marked, "The more the Irish accepted the English language and forgot
their own, the more Irish they became". 7 And religion had a part to play
in this maintenance of a separate identity. The colonizer was Protestant,
the indigenous people Catholic.
The association of religion with domination and exploitation is today
nowhere more evident than in Northern Ireland where sectarianism
presents a direct challenge to the noble Republican aspiration of substi-
tuting "the common name of Irishmen in place of the denomination of
7. The Prepatory Material for the History of Ireland, quoted in S. CRONIN, IRISH NA-
TIONALIsM: A HISTORY OF ITS ROOTS AND IDEOLOGY 11 (1980).
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Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter" (Wolfe Tone). The seeds of this con-
flict were sown in the Ulster plantation of the early seventeenth century
when the British confiscated vast tracts of land in the northeast of the
country and handed them over to English and Scottish settlers. The En-
glish settlers were Anglican by religion, the Scots Presbyterian. The set-
tlers prospered, and to be Protestant was to be part of the ascendancy, to
be Catholic was to be disadvantaged and, for the most part, poor. The
deprivation and discrimination suffered over the years by Catholics in the
north of the island fuelled a resentment which later found expression in
the civil rights movement of the 1960s and a more militant voice in the
long tradition of armed resistance by the I.R.A. to British oppression.
Were it not for the partition of Ireland, the I.R.A. would not exist
today, but rather would enjoy pride of place in Irish history books as na-
tional heroes who contributed to the creation of the Republic proclaimed
in 1916. But Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom, and
the I.R.A., weathering internal splits and repression by both the British
and Irish authorities, has survived. Seventy years on from the Rising, the
I.R.A. still claims to be an army of national liberation, fighting to remove
the last vestiges of colonial occupation by the British from the northeast-
ern part of Ireland.
The last all-Ireland Parliamentary elections were held in December
1918, when Sinn Fein, the political associates of the I.R.A., won 73 of the
105 Irish seats in the British Parliament. Instead of taking up these seats,
those of the 73 who were not in jail or elsewhere on Republican business
met in Dublin, in January 1919, and held their own parliament, the first
Irish Dail.8 The Dail described itself as the parliament of the Irish Re-
public 'proclaimed in Dublin on Easter Monday, 1916, by the Irish Re-
publican Army acting on behalf of the Irish people', and inter alia
adopted a Programme of Social and Democratic Rights based on the 1916
Proclamation. The Dail was of course not recognized by Britain, and it
met clandestinely while hostilities with Britain continued. In 1920, the
British Parliament passed the Government of Ireland Act which effec-
tively partitioned Ireland. Under this Act, there were to be two parlia-
ments in Ireland, both bicameral, one in the North in the six counties,
and one in the South. The first Dail refused to recognize these new insti-
tutions, and when, in 1921, elections were held to the lower house of the
Southern parliament, it regarded the elections as being held for a second
Dail. In the election, 124 Sinn Fein candidates were returned unopposed.
Later in 1921 an Anglo-Irish Treaty was agreed by British and Irish rep-
resentatives, and was approved by the Dail in January 1922, by 64 votes
to 57.
Under the Treaty, a degree of independence was conferred on the 26
8. On the first and second Dails, and the repudiation by the I.R.A. of the 1921 Treaty,
see COOGA, supra note 3, at 40-51; CRONIN, supra note 7, at 123-4, 131f; and J. BOWYER
BELL, THE SECRET ARMY: THE I.R.A. 1916-1979 18-21, 25-26, 30-31 (rev. ed. 1979).
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counties which were henceforth to be known as the Irish Free State. The
new State fell far short of the Irish Republic proclaimed in 1916. For one
thing, it did not encompass the whole island, but only 26 of its 32 coun-
ties. The six counties in the North were allowed to opt out of the Free
State and to retain their own parliament and government and status as
part of the United Kingdom. For another, the 26 counties became a self-
governing dominion of the British Empire, on a par with Australia, Ca-
nada, New Zealand and South Africa, and its status within an empire was
marked by the presence of a British Governor-General in Dublin. Mem-
bers of the new southern Parliament also had to swear an oath of alle-
giance to the British Crown, and the British retained control of a number
of Irish ports. Those Dail deputies who opposed the Treaty walked out of
the southern Parliament, and an I.R.A. convention in Dublin rejected the
Treaty and affirmed its allegiance to an all-Ireland Republic. In the I.R.A.
interpretation of Irish history, it is its army council which is today the
provisional government of the Irish people and 'the direct lineal successor
of the Provisional Government of 1916, the first Dail of 1919 and the sec-
ond Dail of 1921'.'
In the I.R.A. view, neither the Free State Parliament and Govern-
ment, nor their successors under the 1937 Constitution of Ireland, re-
present the Irish people. Indeed, they are usurpers who have betrayed the
Republic proclaimed in 1916. Over time the imperial ties of the Free
State with Britain were severed. An Irish Government under De Valera
subsequently abolished the oath of allegiance, persuaded the British to
relinquish control of the ports, and eventually secured the adoption of a
new Irish Constitution. Under this Constitution, the Governor-General
was replaced by a President, and in 1948 the Irish Parliament passed leg-
islation declaring the State to be a Republic. Yet, according to the I.R.A.
view, while six counties in the North remain under British rule, Ireland,
is not, and cannot be, truly independent. The maintenance of the link
between Northern Ireland and Britain is a colonial remnant, left over
from the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921; and it is the I.R.A. and its political
wing, Sinn Fein, 10 which have remained faithful to the Irish Republic of
1916 and who are the true representatives of the Irish people. Neither the
'21 Treaty nor events subsequent thereto have brought about the com-
plete decolonization of Ireland. British troops in Northern Ireland are an
army of occupation, and the I.R.A. is engaged in a war of national libera-
tion on behalf of the Irish people against an alien, occupying power.
Such is the claim. Let us examine it against the rules and principles
of international law.
9. I.R.A., Green Book, quoted in CooGAN, supra note 3, at 685.
10. When on 2 November 1986, at its annual meeting in Dublin, Sinn Fein dropped its
abstentionist policy with respect to participation in the Irish Parliament and decided to
contest the next general elections in the South, a splinter group which favored continued
abstention formed, calling itself Republican Sinn Fein.
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III. ASSESSMENT
A. The Right of Self-Determination
The word "self-determination" appears to have entered the language
of politics in the mid nineteenth century in connection with the European
nationalism of that day. 1 It does not feature in the Covenant of the
League of Nations, but when the U.N. Charter was adopted in 1945, it
was included, in tandem with equal rights, as a principle of international
law.12 Post 1945, this principle has been developed and fleshed out in the
practice of the United Nations, mainly in the context of that organiza-
tion's decolonization program, but now also extending to situations of
alien domination and occupation as well as racist regimes. Important doc-
uments include the 1960 U.N. General Assembly Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the 1966
International Human Rights Covenants, the 1970 U.N. General Assembly
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-operation Among States, 3 and the 1974 Assembly Resolu-
tion on the Definition of Aggression. In these documents, self-determina-
tion is no longer referred to simply as a principle of international law, but
as a right enjoyed by peoples. It has been lifted out of the exclusively
colonial context and brought within the international movement for the
promotion and protection of human rights. In fact, on one widely-held
view of the right of self-determination, it is a prerequisite for the enjoy-
ment of all individual human rights.1" The evolution of the principle post
1945 outside the U.N. has entailed a similar broadening of its application
to situations of alien domination and exploitation. Recent landmarks in-
clude the 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts, and the 1981 African Charter of Human and Peo-
ples' Rights.
As evidenced by such texts as the International Human Rights Cove-
nants and the African Charter, the right of self-determination is now
widely recognized as a matter of treaty law. Indeed, these treaties, to-
gether with other evidence of state practice such as that mentioned
above, suggest that self-determination is now a universally recognized
right pertaining to peoples under customary international law.
11. See, e.g., U.O. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 3 (1972).
12. Arts.1(2) and 55.
13. These international texts are specifically cited by Sinn Fein in support of the right
of the Irish People to sovereignty, independence and unity: see Fein, supra note 2, at 3-4.
14. See, e.g., H. Gros Espiell, The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of
United Nations Resolutions, Report presented to the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities para.78, E/CN./sub.2/405/Rev.1 (1980); and
A. Cristescu, The Right to Self-Determination: Historical and Current Development on the
Basis of United Nations Instruments, Report presented to the Sub-Commission para.228, E/
CN./sub.2/404/Rev.1 (1981).
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The I.R.A. claim to be exercising the right of self-determination of
the Irish people therefore has a basis in international law in that the exis-
tence of such a right is generally accepted by the international commu-
nity of states at the present time. In its political dimension," self-deter-
mination signifies the right of a people to reject colonial rule or other
forms of alien domination and the freedom to choose both their own ex-
ternal political status and their own form of government. With respect to
choice of political status, the international texts mention a range of op-
tions from emergence as a sovereign independent state to integration with
an existing independent state. With respect to choice of government, ra-
cist regimes are precluded by many of the international texts, and such
regimes are in fact viewed as a legacy of colonial oppression and alien
domination. Otherwise the choice would appear to be an open one.
The I.R.A. claim cites two principal justifications for regarding
Northern Ireland as a self-determination issue: firstly, that Northern Ire-
land is a colony of Britain; and secondly, that it is subject to alien
occupation."6
While there is an obvious overlap between the two justifications in
that when a people is subject to colonial rule, it is also ipso facto subject
to alien domination, the latter may take forms other than colonial rule.
The argument that Northern Ireland is under foreign occupation of a va-
riety other than the colonial cannot be seriously entertained. Indeed, be-
tween 1922 and 1972, until the introduction of direct rule from London,
Northern Ireland had its own regional legislative assembly and govern-
ment, flawed though these institutions may have been in terms of repre-
senting the interests of all sections of the population of Northern Ireland.
Attempts to revive and to remodel such institutions since 1972 have
failed, and direct rule by Britain continues to be the order of the day.
The argument that this constitutes alien rule, and that the British forces
in Northern Ireland are an army of occupation, does not afford a distinct
legal basis for the I.R.A. claim, but is rather a variant of the contention
that Northern Ireland is a British colony.
As we have seen, the Irish people never entirely accepted being ruled
by Britain or forming part of a larger political unit comprising both Ire-
land and Great Britain. They retained a sense of distinct identity and
resented being governed by what they regarded as an alien administra-
tion. This resentment surfaced periodically in violent resistance and Irish
15. For the economic, social and cultural dimensions see, e.g., Espiell, supra note 14,
paras.135-165, and Cristescu, supra note 14, chs.V-VII.
16. The I.R.A. sometimes analogize between the administration of Northern Ireland
and racist regimes. It is alleged that the administration discriminates against a nationalist,
predominantly Catholic minority, and that this is analogous to racism, e.g. in South Africa.
The international texts on self-determination mention only racist regimes and contain no
reference to other forms of oppressive government unless they be "alien" or "colonial". The
allegation is more suited to the non-discrimination norms of international human rights law,
and does not specifically fall within the law relating to self-determination.
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history records a panoply of national heroes and heroines, some operating
within the established political structures of the day to advance Irish in-
dependence, others without. The problem for Irish unity is that, for the
last three to four hundred years, a significant number of the inhabitants
of Ireland, concentrated in the northeastern part of the island, do not
share this sense of Irishness, but see themselves either as British or as a
different variety of Irish to the rest of the inhabitants. The I.R.A. claim
sees the Irish people as comprising the whole population of the island,
including the loyalist concentration in the northeastern corner. The loyal-
ists may be reluctant Irishmen and women but, in that they inhabit an
island which was colonized by Britain and the majority of the inhabitants
of that island wish it to have an existence separate from Britain as a sov-
ereign, independent state, the veto which the loyalists have been allowed
to exercise over the unity of the country for the last 65 years is, in the
I.R.A. view, invalid and contrary to the right of self-determination of the
whole people.
There is some strength in this argument in that most colonial territo-
ries have been treated as a unit for the purpose of decolonization. Colo-
nies with many disparate ethnic groups within their borders have become
independent without reference to the wishes of each of the component
parts, and any tension between groups has been treated as a problem to
be resolved post-decolonization by the new state. However, although this
has been the predominant pattern of decolonization, it has not been a
uniform pattern. There have been instances of a colonial territory being
divided, and of the wishes of the inhabitants of one part of the territory
being respected when they did not accord with those of the inhabitants of
another part or parts. Thus, the Belgian colony of Ruanda-Urundi was
granted independence as two separate states, Rwanda and Burundi; and
the northern region of the British Cameroons joined with Nigeria, the
southern with the state of Cameroun.
1 7
The argument is therefore not watertight. The counter-argument,
that decolonization was effected under the Government of Ireland Act
1920 and the Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921, also has merit. But even if it is
accepted that the decolonization of Ireland in 1920/1921 was only partial,
that Northern Ireland is a colonial remnant, and that full decolonization
in line with the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of the island has
yet to occur, there remains one important question with respect to the
I.R.A. claim - the entitlement of the I.R.A. to speak and act on behalf of
the Irish people, and this involves consideration of the status of national
liberation movements under international law and of the credentials of
any group claiming to be such a movement.
17. See, e.g., M. POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 19-20 (1982)
for these and other examples.
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B. National Liberation Movements
National liberation movements clearly enjoy a degree of legal person-
ality under international law. Organizations such as the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization and the South-West Africa People's Organization have
been afforded observer status in a number of intergovernmental bodies
including the U.N. The League of Arab States has repeatedly endorsed
the right of the P.L.O. to act on behalf of the Palestinians and expressed
support for national liberation movements in South Africa. Polisario rep-
resents the Sahrawi Democratic Republic in the Organization of African
Unity. Of particular significance with respect to the law relating to armed
conflict is the fact that, in 1974, the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaf-
firmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applica-
ble in Armed Conflicts adopted, by consensus, a resolution inviting na-
tional liberation movements recognized by regional intergovernmental
organizations to participate without voting rights in the Conference. Ten
delegations participated in the Conference as representatives of national
liberation movements: the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO),
the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Angola
National Liberation Front (FNLA), the African National Congress
(ANC), the African National Council of Zimbabwe (ANCZ), the Pan Afri-
can Congress (PAC), the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU),
SWAPO, the Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP), and the PLO.
Over 100 states were represented at the Conference, and provision was
made in the Final Act of 1977 for ANC, PLO, PAC and SWAPO to sign
it."8 Moreover, as we have seen, one of the treaties negotiated at the Con-
ference, Geneva Protocol I, has extended the concept of an international
armed conflict to include wars of national liberation. 9 International law
therefore addresses itself to liberation movements, and in accepting the
credentials of particular movements confers on the armed struggles in
which they are engaged a status under the law which is denied to other
situations of violent conflict.
The I.R.A. claims to be a national liberation movement. It is anxious
to distinguish itself from the violent anti-capitalist exploits of groupings
such as the Red Army Faction, Action Directe and the Red Brigades in
Europe. Whatever the merits or demerits of the violent activities of these
groups, they are seen as belonging to a different category to the violent
activities of national liberation movements. Rather the I.R.A. analogizes
between its struggle in Northern Ireland and the Algerian war of indepen-
dence and refers, as a present day parallel, to the oppression of the
colored inhabitants of South Africa by a racist regime.20 The parallels are
at best partial, but they do clearly tie the I.R.A. claim to legitimacy to a
18. See, e.g., Espiell, supra note 14, para.233. See also id. paras.104-5 and 191-233 on
the legal personality and recognition of national liberation movements generally.
19. Art.1(4). See also 96(3).
20. See, e.g., ADAMS, supra note 3, at 5, 28; and CRONIN, supra note 7, at 185, 208.
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recognized institution of international law, the national liberation move-
ment. But is the I.R.A. in fact such a movement? Has it been recognized
as a national liberation movement for the purpose of exercising the right
of self-determination of the Irish people?
Despite the many changes in the nature and structure of interna-
tional law in this century, international law is still essentially a state-
based system of law, and the self-perception of a particular group as a
national liberation movement is not of itself sufficient to confer that sta-
tus on it as a matter of international law. Such status can only be con-
ferred by states, acting either individually or collectively. Have either of
the two internationally-recognized states most directly concerned, the
United Kingdom and Ireland, or any other state or grouping of states
accepted the claim of the I.R.A. to be an army of national liberation?
1. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom does not accept the I.R.A. as the legitimate
representative of the nationalist minority in Northern Ireland, still less of
the whole people of Ireland. Rather the attitude of the British authorities
in recent years has been one of straightforward criminalization. The
I.R.A. is proscribed by law, and persons convicted of offenses relating to
its activities are treated as common criminals.
Government policy towards the I.R.A. had earlier been somewhat less
harsh. In the early '70s, those detained for I.R.A.-related activities were
given special category status while in detention. Special category prison-
ers were housed in special compounds, were allowed to wear their own
clothes, were not required to work, and were afforded additional privi-
leges, such as extra visits and food parcels. In November 1975, however,
this changed. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland announced the
Government's intention to phase out special category status, and this pro-
cess began on March 1, 1976. No prisoner convicted on or after that date
has been accorded special category treatment.2 ' Neither 'dirty protests',
nor hunger strikes, nor resort to the human rights institutions in Stras-
bourg, have succeeded in securing the reintroduction of such status.
Even when granted, the status, although signifying an acceptance by
the authorities that the I.R.A. prisoners were of a somewhat different spe-
cies to 'ordinary' criminals, cannot be regarded as tantamount to confer-
ral of prisoner-of-war status or to recognition by the United Kingdom of
the I.R.A. as a national liberation movement. As we have seen, Geneva
Protocol I brings within the scope of international armed conflicts and
therefore of the substantial body of international humanitarian law relat-
ing thereto "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exer-
21. See McFeeley v. United Kingdom, 20 DECISIONS AND REPORTS OF THE EUR. COMM'N
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 44, 48 (1980) (decision of the Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
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cise of their right of self-determination."22 At the time of signing this
Protocol in 1977, the British Government entered several reservations in-
cluding one requiring a certain level of intensity of military operations
before a situation could be regarded as an armed conflict, and another
that an authority which claims to represent a people "be recognized as
such by the appropriate intergovernmental organization." No such recog-
nition has been afforded the I.R.A., and the British authorities would
deny that the level of intensity of military operations in Northern Ireland
is sufficient to constitute a non-international armed conflict (governed by
Protocol II), let alone an international armed conflict (governed by Proto-
col I).23
Another indicator of possible recognition by the United Kingdom of
a conflict situation in Northern Ireland is the fact that for years the Brit-
ish Government took advantage of Article 15 of the European Convention
on Human Rights to derogate from its human rights obligations under
that Convention. Article 15 allows derogation in "time of war or other
emergency threatening the life of the nation." But while the British au-
thorities would concede that there was an emergency situation in North-
ern Ireland, they would not concede that there was a war or international
armed conflict. Moreover, on August 22, 1984, the United Kingdom with-
drew its notice of derogation under the Convention.
2. Ireland
Articles 1-3 of the Irish Constitution assert the right of self-determi-
nation of the Irish nation and give expression to the nationalist aspiration
to a united Ireland. Article 1 affirms, inter alia, the right of the nation to
choose its own form of government. Article 2 states that the national ter-
ritory comprises the whole island of Ireland, its islands and territorial
seas. Article 3 provides that, although the Parliament and Government
established by the Constitution have the right to exercise jurisdiction
over the whole of the national territory, the laws enacted by that Parlia-
ment shall, pending the re-integration of the national territory, apply
22. Art.1(4).
23. The U.K. has not yet ratified Protocol I. Under it, even a member of a national
liberation movement will forfeit the right to be regarded as a prisoner-of-war when captured
if she/he fails to carry arms openly during each military engagement and during such time
as that member is visible to the adversary while engaged in a military deployment preceding
the launching of an attack: see Art.44(3). The U.K. has also signed (but not yet ratified)
Protocol II which applies to non-international armed conflicts between the armed forces of a
Contracting Party and "dissident armed forces or other organized groups which, under re-
sponsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement [the] Protocol",
Art.1(1). It does not apply to situations of "internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed
conflicts", Art.1(2). Although the I.R.A. is an organized armed group with a command struc-
ture, it is debatable whether, by the level and nature of its military operations, it would
attract the application of this Protocol.
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only to the 26 counties. No Irish Government post 1922 has accepted that
the I.R.A. is entitled to act on behalf of the Irish people. The present
Constitution was adopted by referendum in the 26 counties in 1937 in the
name of the people of Ireland,2' and according to Article 3 it is the Parlia-
ment and Government established by the Constitution which have the
right to exercise jurisdiction over the entire national territory, not any
other institution or group.
There is widespread sympathy among the population of the South
for the nationalist aim of the I.R.A., but less sympathy for the means it
uses to realize this goal. It has often been noted that the Irish are ambiva-
lent in their attitude to violence, but this ambivalence has been less
marked in recent years with increasing condemnation not only of indis-
criminate bombings in the North but also of targeted attacks on state
personnel such as members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and of the
judiciary.2" After a slight upsurge in popular support following the death
of ten hunger strikers in the North in 1981,26 concern has switched to
more mundane matters such as the high level of taxation, the ever in-
creasing rate of unemployment and the continuing drain of emigration.
The unity of Ireland by any means, whether violent or non-violent, is no
longer high on the list of political priorities in the South.
This hardening of popular opinion in the 1980s towards the use of
violence has been mirrored in the courts. Where less than ten years ago a
person wanted for I.R.A.-related activities in the North would have suc-
cessfully resisted extradition on the basis of the political offence excep-
tion, the plea is now much more readily rejected by the courts. Instead of
being categorized as political, the offence for which the person is wanted
is more likely to be described as "revolting and cowardly" and as
'dishonoring the cause espoused by its perpetrator',2 7 and the fugitive ac-
cordingly extradited to the North. Moreover, the courts now cite the Irish
Constitution to condemn organizations such as the I.R.A. as treasonable
and hence deny then any recognition under the political offence
exception."8
In like vein, Irish Governments have taken a succession of measures
to suppress and marginalize the I.R.A. In February 1986, the then Gov-
ernment signed the European Convention on the Suppression of Terror-
ism, and in December of that year introduced legislation into Parliament
24. 65% of the electorate voted and 57% of those who voted approved the
Constitution.
25. There has been particular revulsion at attacks on economic targets, such as building
contractors who repair British army barracks.
26. See ADAMS, supra note 3, at 80-85. Sinn Fein polled a low vote in the February 1987
general election in the Republic and failed to gain a seat.
27. McGlinchey v. Wren [19821 I.R. 154 at 159. See also Shannon v. Fanning [1984]
I.R. 569, and Quinn v. Wren [1985] I.R. 322.
28. Arts. 15.6 and 39: see Quinn [19851 I.R. 322. This case concerned the I.N.L.A., not
the I.R.A.
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to give effect in Irish law to the Convention. The main targets of this
legislation are of course groups such as the I.R.A. and the I.N.L.A. A
year earlier, in November 1985, the Government concluded the Anglo-
Irish Agreement. 9 This agreement tackles head on, in its very first Arti-
cle, the question of the status of Northern Ireland. Under it, the British
and Irish Governments 'affirm that any change in the status of Northern
Ireland will only come about with the consent of a majority of the people
of Northern Ireland', "recognize that the present wish of a majority of the
people of Northern Ireland is for no change in the status of Northern
Ireland", and "declare that, if in the future a majority of the people of
Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the establish-
ment of a united Ireland, they will introduce and support in the respec-
tive Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish."
In concluding this Agreement, the two Governments recognize and
attempt to reconcile the two traditions in Northern Ireland, the loyalist
and the nationalist, and assert that any change in the status of that terri-
tory may only come about by constitutional means, and moreover by
means which respect the wishes of the majority of the population of
Northern Ireland. This sounds very like a classic implementation of self-
determination, except that the people exercising the right are no longer
the people of the whole island, still less those of the United Kingdom as a
unit, but the people of Northern Ireland. On the one side, the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom has formally accepted that a majority of the
inhabitants of Northern Ireland may one day wish to be united with the
Irish Republic rather than to continue as part of the United Kingdom,
and has undertaken to give effect to that wish should it arise. On the
other side, the Irish Government has conceded that the nationalist claim
to Northern Ireland should not take priority over the wishes of a majority
of its inhabitants, and that, although the Irish Government has been
given a consultative role under the Agreement with respect to certain
matters in Northern Ireland, it is ultimately the people of Northern Ire-
land who will themselves decide their own future.
3. Other States
It would appear that the only state which today unequivocally recog-
nizes the I.R.A. as waging a war of national liberation in Northern Ireland
against an occupying colonial power is Libya. W'ile statesmen of other
countries have from time to time expressed support for the nationalist
cause, there has been no endorsement of violence in pursuit of this cause,
much less acceptance that the I.R.A. is the legitimate representative of
the Irish people for the purpose of securing Irish unity.
The situation in Northern Ireland has over the years come before
29. The present Prime Minister of Ireland, after initially rejecting the Agreement while
in opposition, has indicated that his Government will in fact honor it: see The Irish Times,
March 17 and 18, 1987.
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many international fora including the U.N. Human Rights Commission
and the European Court of Human Rights, but concern about human
rights violations is one thing, categorization of the situation in which they
occur as an international armed conflict is another, and it has never been
accepted by any intergovernmental organization that there is currently
being waged in Northern Ireland a war of national liberation. In 1969,
when violence escalated in Northern Ireland, the Irish Government at-
tempted to bring the situation before the U.N. and to persuade the Brit-
ish Government to allow a U.N. peacekeeping force into Northern Ire-
land. The U.K. rejected this suggestion, and when it also managed to
persuade the U.S.A. that the situation was an internal civil rights matter,
the prospect of U.N. action evaporated.80 Furthermore, as we have seen,
one of the fora in which the question of the status of specific organiza-
tions as national liberation movements was addressed was the Geneva
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, and the
I.R.A. was not among the movements invited to participate in the
Conference.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although the argument that Northern Ireland is a British colony ap-
pears at first sight plausible given the history of Ireland, on closer exami-
nation, it becomes clear that it does not mesh entirely with reality. As far
as the vast majority of states in the world today are concerned, Ireland
was decolonized in 1922 with the establishment of the Irish Free State, or
at some time in the following decades when the new state began to assert
its independence of Britain. Northern Ireland is today legally part of the
United Kingdom, a status most recently confirmed in the Anglo-Irish
Agreement by the government with the greatest interest in the territory
and its inhabitants apart from Britain, that is, the Irish Government.
But even if it be accepted that Northern Ireland is a lingering out-
post of a once great empire and represents "unfinished business", 3' the
claim of the I.R.A. to be exercising the right of self-determination of the
Irish people is weak and has not been generally endorsed by the interna-
tional community of states. Nor can it claim to represent the people of
Northern Ireland, the majority of whom have for the last 65 years made it
clear that they want no part of Irish unity. That leaves the nationalist
minority in Northern Ireland, but international law has not yet accepted
that a minority may constitute a people for the purpose of exercising the
right of self-determination.
To reject as not well-founded in international law the claim of the
I.R.A. to be a national liberation movement is not to denigrate the cour-
age of many of its members or to question the sincerity with which they
30. See COOGAN, supra note 3, at 426; and BOWYER BiL, supra note 8, at 364.
31. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 38.
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hold this view. The fact is that they are not 'ordinary' criminals, and no
amount of terrorist labelling can make them so. Both the British and the
Irish Governments should recognize this. Some recognition may be af-
forded the ideological motivation of members of the I.R.A. and some dis-
tinction drawn between them and 'ordinary' criminals, without conceding
that they are waging a war of national liberation and without conferring
on them the status of combatants or prisoners-of-war when detained.
Thus, the authorities in Northern Ireland could allow them certain privi-
leges denied to other prisoners, and the Irish authorities could retain the
political offence exception to extradition for acts which, if they had oc-
curred in a situation of recognized armed conflict, would be regarded as
legitimate. In this latter connection, it is my view that the European Con-
vention on the Suppression of Terrorism is too crude an instrument in
that it provides for extradition for certain offenses irrespective of motiva-
tion and of the context and circumstances in which the offence occurs. To
kill an 'enemy' soldier in an imagined war of national liberation is not the
same thing as to plant a bomb on a crowded bus. In an actual war or
armed conflict, the former killing may be legitimate, the latter is
prohibited.
The I.R.A. of 1987 is not the same organization as the I.R.A. (Irish
Volunteers) of 1916. It is a time-warp to view the I.R.A. today as an army
of national liberation. Much water has passed under the bridge since
1916. A new state with democratic institutions has come into existence in
the greater part of the island, and even in the North some democratic
institutions survive, however inadequate they may be.
The way forward in Northern Ireland with its horrendous social
problems and imbedded religious bigotry is not through the gun. Signifi-
cant social reform is needed not only to end discrimination in such mat-
ters as jobs and housing, but to secure to each member of the community
irrespective of religious affiliation, political beliefs or social class, a life of
dignity. The greatest problem of all is clearly sectarianism, and one of the
greatest perpetrators of sectarianism is the system of segregated educa-
tion at primary and secondary levels- segregation not on the basis of
color or sex, but of religion. Integrated schooling must be seen as a prior-
ity. Such radical change would be resisted by powerful vested interests,
but where there's a will, there's a way. Ironically, the introduction of such
reform would in all probability be fundamentally undemocratic in that it
would have to be introduced against the wishes of the majority of the
population on both sides of the sectarian divide. Without such reform,
however, little will change. Bigotry will continue to stalk the land claim-
ing victims and, as in the past, the seething cauldron will periodically
bubble over in violent fashion. There must be a better way.
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